Under 1% of Token Holders Have 90% of DAO Voting Power, on a Public Ledger
Ask a room of nonprofit leaders which giving vehicle is more transparent, the on-chain donor collective or the donor-advised fund, and most will name the fund without pausing, because the fund lives inside familiar tax law while the collective runs on a blockchain they will never open. The honest answer runs the other way, and the reason it does surfaces a question the field has been able to avoid, which is whether it trusts the vehicles it can see into or only the vehicles it has quietly agreed not to look at too hard.
Start with the on-chain collective, the decentralized autonomous organization that lets the people who hold its tokens vote on where a shared pool of money goes. When Chainalysis analyzed the governance tokens of ten major collectives, it found that across several of them less than one percent of holders held 90 percent of the voting power. A 2026 peer-reviewed review of DAO governance found low participation under every voting model it studied, with a minority of members active and most members rarely casting a vote. Those findings are damaging, and they are damaging in public, because every vote and every wallet is written to a ledger anyone can audit. The collective earns its critique by being legible, so the same transparency that was meant to prove its fairness is what now records its capture.
Hold that next to the donor-advised fund, the account a donor funds today, with the full tax deduction taken immediately, and then recommends grants from over the years they choose, while the sponsoring charity that holds the account keeps legal control of the money. The fund is treated as the growth engine of modern giving, and the treatment rests on real numbers, because a multi-sponsor dataset released this year showed donor-advised fund revenue growing at a seventy-five percent median rate from 2021 to 2025 while non-fund revenue grew at nine percent, and showed a cohort of donors who moved into fund giving raising their giving more than tenfold. The vehicle looks like participation widening. What the public record shows about who decides once the money is inside is limited, because the disclosure rules require little at the level of the individual fund. The sponsor's annual Form 990, the information return every public charity files with the IRS, reports its donor-advised funds in aggregate, meaning the number of funds, the contributions in, the grants out and the year-end value, and it lists larger grants by recipient without tying any grant to the fund or the advisor behind it. A 2026 peer-reviewed study of donor-advised fund giving puts the same rule plainly: sponsors report grant recipients only in aggregate and need not disclose the grantees of, or the donors to, any individual fund.
The concentration is present regardless, and once in a while an outside analyst makes it briefly visible. An independent study of the largest sponsors found that two and nine-tenths billion dollars moved between national donor-advised-fund sponsors in a single year, in 2023, rather than to working charities, up from about one billion in 2019, and the figure reaches four and four-tenths billion once transfers from national sponsors to community foundations are counted. The number matters less for its size than for how it came to light, because the only reason anyone could see the money circling inside the system was a one-time investigation rather than a standing disclosure the vehicle produces on its own.
Set the two vehicles beside each other and the asymmetry stops being about blockchains and becomes about which failures each vehicle is built to report. The collective concentrates control and shows you the concentration as it happens. The fund concentrates control and shows you a growth statistic while a researcher has to reconstruct the rest by hand. The field reads the first as a warning about digital giving and the second as proof of the fund's maturity, so the judgment tracks how legible each vehicle is rather than how concentrated each one has become. This is the center of what the DIA Protocol calls Algorithmic Trust, the distance between stewardship that is measured and stewardship that is only felt, and it is why a vehicle can feel safe precisely because it declines to be measured.
For nonprofit and foundation professionals, the practical consequence is that the transparency you demand of a new rail is a test you have never run on the old one, so when you tell a board that on-chain giving is too opaque to trust, the more accurate statement is that on-chain giving is the first vehicle transparent enough to be caught, and a rail that reports its own concentration hands you something you can govern while a rail that reports only its growth hands you something you can only hope about.
For digital and crypto-native giving leaders, the finding cuts against the instinct to hide the concentration ratios until the tooling looks tidier, because a giving collective that publishes who holds the votes has handed its donors a governing instrument the donor-advised fund has never offered, so sanding down that legibility in pursuit of a maturity that only resembles the fund would trade away the collective's one real advantage.
For donors and family-office advisors, the asymmetry changes what a payout rate is worth, because a donor who wants evidence that a gift reached a cause cannot get it from a headline distribution figure that fund-to-fund transfers can pad, so the advisor's task moves from quoting the number to asking the sponsor what share of distributions reached operating charities rather than other funds.
For corporate giving and CSR leaders, the same measurability gap decides which partners a company can actually stand behind, because a matching program or a corporate fund routed through a sponsor inherits whatever opacity the sponsor carries, so a firm that reports its giving to stakeholders may be reporting a number it cannot trace to a charity on the ground.
For NGOs and international organizations, meaning groups that move money or programs across country borders, the gap is widest where oversight is hardest, because cross-border grants already pass through intermediaries whose internal flows are rarely visible, so the vehicles that can show where the money paused, rather than only that it grew, are the ones a cross-border funder can defend to a regulator or a community.
The comparison has a limit worth stating, because the two vehicles are not equivalent in every respect and the argument here is narrower than it may sound. A donor-advised fund operates inside a body of tax law, fiduciary duty and state charity regulation that an on-chain collective largely does not, and that framework does real protective work that no amount of ledger transparency substitutes for. The claim is not that the collective is the safer vehicle. The claim is that on the specific question of whether an outsider can observe where control actually sits, the newer vehicle reports on itself and the older one does not, and the field has been reading that difference backwards.
The practical move is to ask the question you have not been asking. Before recommending, funding or joining any giving vehicle, ask what it publishes about its own concentration without being asked, and ask what it would take for an outsider to reconstruct the answer if it published nothing. A vehicle that hands you the answer is governable. A vehicle that requires an investigation is not, however sound its legal framework may be.
The diagnostic question underneath all of it is short. When your field decides that one giving vehicle is trustworthy and another is risky, are you measuring where control actually sits, or are you measuring which vehicle was built to let you see where control sits?
The Strategic Steward Diagnostic
If you judge a giving vehicle by how comfortable it makes you rather than by what it lets you measure, the evidence suggests you are rewarding the vehicles that reveal the least, and the concentration you cannot see is the one you cannot govern.
If you judge a vehicle by whether it lets you trace where control sits, you are measuring stewardship rather than familiarity, and the newest rails will tend to score better than the oldest. Which one describes your organization right now?
"When a field calls the vehicle it can audit risky and the vehicle it cannot audit mature, it is grading transparency by how comfortable the vehicle makes it, and that is a standard worth revisiting."EILEEN HERNANDEZ, THE STRATEGIC STEWARD
That is the work Algorithmic Trust asks of the field, because a giving system earns trust by being measurable rather than by being familiar, and the vehicles now entering philanthropy are, for the first time, measurable enough to be held to that standard.
How to Cite This Article
Hernandez, E. (2026). Under 1% of Token Holders Have 90% of DAO Voting Power, on a Public Ledger. *The Strategic Steward*. Retrieved November 3, 2026, from https://thestrategicsteward.com/insights/we-can-name-the-one-percent-that-runs-a-dao
Further Reading
Eileen Hernandez, The Strategic Steward
How the volume of governance decisions put to a community shapes who ends up making them.
Eileen Hernandez, The Strategic Steward
A companion look at how giving structures, rather than donor capacity, shape who participates.
About the Frameworks
This article is anchored to Pillar 1 of the DIA Protocol, Algorithmic Trust, which names the distance between stewardship that is measured and stewardship that is only felt. The argument here is that a giving vehicle earns trust by being measurable rather than by being familiar, and that the field has been reading legibility as risk.
The four DIA Protocol pillars are fixed: Algorithmic Trust, Participatory Ownership, Technological Value Proposition, and Disintermediated Impact.
Sources & References
Chainalysis (2023). Introduction to Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs). Chainalysis blog, published April 7, 2023; the post describes its analysis of ten major DAOs' governance tokens as conducted the prior year (2022). Figure: section 'Key features of DAOs' (less than 1% of all holders have 90% of the voting power, across several of the ten).View →
Jungnickel, M., Özdemir Sönmez, F., Mulligan, C., & Knottenbelt, W. J. (2026). DAO Governance: Voting Power, Participation, and Controversy, A Review and an Empirical Analysis. Distributed Ledger Technologies: Research and Practice, 5(4), Article 49, ACM, published June 10, 2026, open access. Figures: Section 6.3.1 (low voter engagement across all governance models; a minority of members participate actively while the vast majority rarely casts a vote); Section 5.2.1 (median Gini coefficients 0.98, 0.75, 0.46).View →
Institute for Policy Studies (Flannery, H., et al.) (2025). Independent Report on Donor-Advised Funds. Institute for Policy Studies.View →
K2D Strategies, Chariot and Candid (2026). 2026 DAF Fundraising Report. Chariot.View →
Internal Revenue Service (2024). Instructions for Schedule D (Form 990). Internal Revenue Service, Instructions for Schedule D (Form 990), Rev. December 2024, continuous use. Figures: Part I, Organizations Maintaining Donor Advised Funds or Other Similar Funds or Accounts, lines 1 through 4 (total number of funds; aggregate contributions; aggregate grants; aggregate year-end value).View →
Internal Revenue Service (2024). Instructions for Schedule I (Form 990). Internal Revenue Service, Instructions for Schedule I (Form 990), Rev. December 2024, continuous use. Figures: Part II, grants to domestic organizations and governments over $5,000, columns (a) through (h); no column ties a grant to a donor advised fund or its advisor.View →
Internal Revenue Service (2026). Donor-advised funds. Internal Revenue Service, Charities and Nonprofits, page 'Donor-advised funds', accessed October 6, 2026. Statement: once the donor makes the contribution the organization has legal control over it, while the donor or the donor's representative retains advisory privileges.View →
Flannery, H., & Mittendorf, B. (2026). Are Donor-Advised Funds Facilitating Opaque Giving to Politically Engaged Charities?. Nonprofit Policy Forum, 17(1-2), p. 99, De Gruyter, 2026, DOI 10.1515/npf-2024-0028, peer reviewed. Figure: Introduction (DAF sponsors are only required to disclose grant recipients in aggregate in their Form 990 Schedule I, and are not required to disclose either the grantees of or the donors to individual funds). Note: lead author is affiliated with the Institute for Policy Studies, a critic of DAFs; the disclosure rule is verified directly against the IRS instructions above.View →
Hernandez, E. (2025). The DIA Protocol. Unpublished doctoral framework, Pepperdine University GSEP.
Eileen Hernandez
is a philanthropic strategist, nonprofit founder, and doctoral researcher at Pepperdine University's Graduate School of Education and Psychology, where her research examines how emerging digital giving communities build collective knowledge across institutional and decentralized structures. She is the founder of Sons and Daughters Foundation and the creator of the DIA Protocol framework for participatory philanthropic design.